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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
TS 1 PARTNERSHIP, an INDIANA
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Appellate Court No,
910189-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Category (b) (16)

v.
PENNY ALLRED d/b/a IT'S ABOUT
TIME,
Defendant and Appellant.
ooOoo
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
1.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals

to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1953 as
amended).
2.

This appeal is from multiple Orders of the Third Judicial

District Court as follows:
(a)

Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on

Plaintiff's Complaint;
(b)

Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on

Defendant's Counterclaims;
(c)

Granting

Plaintiff's

Motion

Defendant's Request for Jury Trial; and
1

to

Strike

the

(d)

Overruling

Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's

Affidavit of Fees.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did

the Affidavit

of Defendant/Appellant,

filed

in

opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, raise a
genuine issue as to a fact material to Plaintiff's right to obtain
recovery for past due lease installments pursuant to a written
lease agreement?

Plaintiff's Summary Judgment was granted by the

lower Court, as a matter of law, and is therefore subject to review
for correctness by this Court.

Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751

P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
2.

Did

the Memorandum

filed

by

Defendant/Appellant

in

opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on her
counterclaims, which Memorandum contained no statement of facts and
was unsupported by either Affidavit or any other evidentiary
material, raise a genuine issue as to a material fact which could
have precluded dismissal of her counterclaims?

Plaintiff's Motion

for Summary Judgment was granted by the lower court as a matter of
law and is therefore subject to review for correctness. Barber v.
Farmers Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
3.

Did the District Court err in finding, as a matter of

fact, that Defendant/Appellant waived her right to jury trial? The
findings of the trial court are entitled to a presumption of
2

correctness and evidence relevant to each finding shall be viewed
in the light most favorable to the finding.

The finding must be

sustained unless it is clearly erroneous. College Irr. v. Logan R.
and The Blacksmith F.. 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989).
4.
abuse

Did the District Court commit patent error and a clear
of

its

broad

Defendant's/Appellant's

discretion

objection

to

in

overruling

Appellee's

Affidavit

the
of

Attorney's Fees? The decision of the District Court is entitled to
deference and subject to review only on the basis of patent error
and clear abuse of discretion. Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692
(Utah 1982).
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon.
The
motion shall be served at least 10 days before
the time affixed for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits.
The judgment sought
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.
A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration;
(2) Motions for summary judgment.

(a) Memorandum in support of motion.
The
points and authorities in support of a motion
for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists.
The facts shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and
shall specifically refer to those portions of
the record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion.
The points and authorities in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which the party contends
a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences
and shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the opposing party
relies, and if applicable, shall state the
numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's
facts that are disputed. All material facts
set forth in the movant's statement and
properly supported by an accurate reference to
the record shall be deemed admitted for the
purpose
of
summary
judgment
unless
specifically controverted by the opposing
party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered
without a hearing unless ordered by the court,
or requested by the parties as provided in
paragraph (3)(b) or (4) below.
Utah Constitution. Article I, § 10. [Trial by jury]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury
shall consist of 8 jurors.
In courts of
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of
4 jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall
be unanimous.
In civil cases 3/4 of the
4

jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil
cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-1 (1953 as amended):
In actions for the recovery of specific real
and personal property, with or without
damages, or for money claimed as due upon
contract or as damages for breach of contract,
or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried
by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a
reference is ordered.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about June 13, 1990 the Appellee commenced the present
action against Appellant

(R. 2) .

Pursuant to its Complaint,

Appellee sought recovery

from Appellant as a tenant under a

commercial lease agreement for past due lease payments (R. 2 and
3).

On

July

13, 1990

the

Defendant

filed

an Answer

and

Counterclaim, which pleading included a request for jury trial (R.
68).

Appellee filed a Reply to the Counterclaim on July 26, 1990

(R. 75).
On July 26, 1990 Appellee filed a Motion, supported by a
Memorandum, to strike the request of Appellant for a jury trial (R.
75 and 139). On August 8, 1990 the Appellant filed an Affidavit in
Opposition to the Motion to Strike as well as a Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition (R. 141 and 145).

Appellee's

Motion to Strike Request for Jury Trial was predicated upon a
contractual waiver of jury trial (R. 80). Appellantfs opposition
thereto was predicated on the allegation that Appellant was not
5

aware of the presence of the waiver in her contract (R. 146 at J
6) . Appellee filed a Reply Memorandum on August 17, 1990 (R. 148) .
No hearing was requested by either party, and Appelleefs Motion to
Strike was granted by Minute Entry of the court dated August 21,
1990 (R. 154).
Over two (2) years later the Appellant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's original ruling striking Appellant's
request for a jury trial (R 496).
supported by a Memorandum

(R 498).

The Appellant's Motion was
Appellee filed a Response

Memorandum on September 24, 1992 (R. 506).

The Appellant never

noticed up for decision her Motion for Reconsideration.
Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its Complaint
on September 19, 1990 (R.157).

That Motion was supported by a

Memorandum and Affidavit filed contemporaneously therewith (R. 159
and 221). Appellee further filed an Affidavit in Support of its
Request for Attorney's Fees (R. 227). Appellant filed an Affidavit
in Opposition thereto, (R. 236) and a Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition (R. 233) .

The Appellee filed a Reply

Memorandum on October 22, 1990 (R. 239) and submitted the matter
for decision (R. 270). No hearing was requested by either party,
and Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted by Minute
Entry of the court dated October 25, 1990 (R. 270).

6

On December

20, 1990 Appellant

filed

a Motion

Execution and a Memorandum in Support thereof

to Stay

(R.279 & 283).

Appellant's request for a stay of execution was predicated upon the
allegation that Appellee's order was not final (R.279 at J 1). On
December 31, 1990 Appellee filed a Motion to Revise Judgment
supported by a Memorandum, as well as a Memorandum in Opposition to
Appellant's Motion to Stay Execution (R.287).
to Appellee's Motion for Revision of Judgment.

Appellant responded
The Appellant did

not contest Appellee's Rule 54(b) Motion but rather merely argued
that execution should be stayed to allow her to appeal (R. 298) .
Appellee filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of said Motion (R.
301).

Again, no hearing was requested, and Appellee's Motion for

Revision was granted on January 16, 1991 (R. 310) . Counsel for the
Appellant jointly approved the certification (R. 311). Appellant's
first attempted appeal ensued (R. 315).
After the Appellant had filed her original brief and the
Appellee had responded, this Court sent a Notice of Sua Sponte
Consideration for Summary Disposition.

A copy of the Court's

Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by
this reference.

This Court questioned the propriety of the Rule

54(b) certification based in part on the case of Kennecott Corp. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991), which case had
not been decided at the time of the certification.
7

Both Appellee

and Appellant attempted to defend the Rule 54(b) (R. 552 and 564)
certification.

However, the case was remanded to the District

Court for further proceedings on January 8, 1992.

A copy of the

Order of Remand is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated
herein by this reference.
Following remand Appellee filed on September 3, 1992 a Motion
for Summary Judgment on Appellant's Counterclaims, which Motion was
supported by documentary evidence attached thereto and by an
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees in Support of Appellee's Request for
Additional Attorney's Fees (R. 358). Appellant filed a Memorandum
in Response on September 17, 1992 (R. 487). Appellee filed a Reply
Memorandum in Support of its Motion on September 24, 1992 (R. 509) .
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was noticed up for decision
on September 29, 1992 (R. 518). Appellee's Motion was granted by
Minute Entry dated October 14, 1992 (R. 520). The Appellant filed
an Objection to Appellee's Affidavit of Attorney's Fees on October
21, 1992 (R. 528). The Appellee filed a Memorandum in Response to
the Objection on October 27, 1992

(R. 549).

The Appellant's

Objection to the Affidavit of Attorney's Fees was never noticed up
for decision.

Instead the Appellant commenced the present appeal

(R. 624).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
1.

Appellee is an Indiana Limited Partnership and the owner

and landlord of the Trolley Square Mall located in Salt Lake City,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 2 and 3).
2.

It is undisputed that on or about March 4, 1987 Appellee,

as landlord, and Appellant, as tenant, entered

into a Lease

Agreement, a true and accurate copy of which was attached to
Appellee's Complaint as Exhibit "A" (R. 3 and 69).
3.

It is undisputed that on or March 11, 1988 Appellee and

Appellant entered into and executed an Agreement Setting Lease Term
relevant to the aforementioned lease.
4.

(R. 3 and 69).

Appellee on September 19, 1990 filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment.
5.

On October 9, 1990 the Appellant filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment which Memorandum was
supported by the Affidavit of Appellant (R. 233 and 236).
6.

In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellant

admitted, through her responsive memorandum, the following facts:
(a) Appellant

agreed

to

pay

rent

for

the

period

commencing October 8, 1987 and continuing through October 31,
1989 (R. 160 at J 3 and R. 233);

9

(b)

Appellant agreed to pay rentals as set forth in the

summary of fundamental lease provisions (R. 160 at J 4 and R.
233) ;
(c)

Appellant

remained

in possession

of

the

leased

premises through February 4, 1990 (R. 160 at f 5 and R. 233);
(d)

Appellant is responsible in the event of any default

for payment of attorney's fees, legal expenses and costs of
collection

in addition to any principal

and

interest

due

pursuant to the Lease Agreement (R. 160 at 5 6 and R. 233);
(e)

Appellant has failed to pay lease payments and is in

default of the Lease Agreement (R. 160 at f 7 and R. 233).
7.

Appellee alleged in its Motion for Summary Judgment and

Supporting Affidavit that there existed a balance due and owing
pursuant to the Lease Agreement in the sum of $13,300.32 as of
February 4, 1990 (R. 222 at 1 7 and 160 at J 8 ) .
8.

The Affidavit of Appellant, filed in opposition to the

Motion for Summary Judgment, alleges the following facts relevant
to the present appeal:
(a)
under

the

fl

I do not dispute that the amount due and owing
terms

of

my

lease

with

TS

1

Partnership

is

$6,665.98" (R. 237 at 1 3 ) .
(b)

"However, I dispute that the remaining $13,300.32

prayed for in the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is

10

due and owing under the terms of the Lease" (R. 237 at J
4(c)).

"Under the terms of the lease, the lessor was to

provide me with heat and air conditioning for my store, "It's
About Time". "For the period of time when I was the lessee of
TS 1 Partnership, these "HVAC" charges totalled $6,054.29" (R.
237 at J 4 and 5(c)).

"However, the "bay" where my store was

located was never connected with the duct system that provided
HVAC services.

I received no heat or air conditioning in my

store" (R. 237 at J 6 and 7).

The remaining allegations of

the Affidavit of Appellant, specifically paragraphs 8 and 9,
allege that she is not obligated for certain minor charges
which were included in the Affidavit of Amount Due of Shelly
Sutton filed by Appellee in support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment.

These allegations are irrelevant as Appellee did

not obtain judgment for these amounts

(R. 237, 240 and

273).
9.

Appellee in its Motion for Summary Judgment alleged

attorney's fees due and owing in the amount of $1,560.00 (R. 228
and 161 at 1 9).

Appellant does not deny this allegation.

FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM
1.

Appellee

filed

its Motion

for

Summary

Judgment on

Appellant's Counterclaim on September 3, 1992 (R. 358).

11

2.

Appellee's Motion was supported by a Memorandum which

included a Statement of Facts, all of which were supported by
references to the record (R. 360).
3.

When Appellant

filed her Memorandum

in Response she

conceded the accuracy of all facts as alleged by Appellee (R. 487) .
4.

Pursuant to the first cause of action of Appellant's

Counterclaim, Appellant sought recovery of sums expended on tenant
improvements (R. 71).
5.

The properly supported Statement of Facts contained in

Appellee's Memorandum, and admitted by the Appellant, includes
references

to

sixteen

Agreement

which

make

(16) different
tenant

sections

improvements

of
the

the

Lease

tenant's

responsibility (R. 362-363).
6.

Pursuant to the third cause of action of the Appellant's

Counterclaim, Appellant sought recovery of unspecified sums for
business lost as a result of Appellee's remodeling of the Trolley
Square Mall (R. 73).
7.

The properly supported Statement of Facts contained in

the Appellee's Memorandum, and admitted by the Appellant, includes
references

to

the

contract

provisions

which

establish

the

following:
(a)

Appellee had not only the right but the duty to

remodel the mall;
12

(b)

Appellee had not only the right but the duty to

maintain the structural integrity of the mall;
(c)

Appelleefs right included the right to temporarily

but completely close the mall in furtherance of remodeling and
maintenance (R. 363-364).
8.

The Lease Agreement which was filed with the court in

conjunction
incorporated

with
in

Appellee's
Appellee's

Motion
Statement

for
of

Summary
Facts

Judgment
provides

and
that

Appellee has no liability to the Appellant for losses sustained as
a result of business interruption arising from or connected to
carrying out Appellee's duty to maintain and remodel the mall (R.
373).
9#

Pursuant to Appellant's second cause of action, Appellant

sought recovery of damages allegedly resulting from Appellee having
permitted a store to be opened in the Mall which store carried a
product line similar to Appellants and therefore in competition
with Appellant's product line (R. 72).
10.

The properly supported Statement of Facts contained in

the Appellee's Memorandum, and admitted by the Appellant, includes
the allegation that the lease contains no provision conferring on
the Appellant an exclusive right to sell any line of merchandise
(R. 364).

13

11.

The properly supported Statement of Facts contained in

Appelleefs Memorandum, and admitted by the Appellant, includes the
allegation that the lease is an integration (R. 361).
12.

The Memorandum

filed by the Appellant contained no

statement of facts and is not supported by affidavits, documentary
evidence, references to discovery or any evidentiary material of
any kind (R. 487).
FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STRIKE REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL
1.

It

is undisputed

that on or about March

4, 1987,

Appellee, as landlord, and Appellant, as tenant, entered into a
Lease Agreement, a true and accurate copy of which was attached to
Appellee's Complaint as Exhibit "A" (R. 3 and 69).
2.

The Lease Agreement contains a clause waiving right to

jury trial.

Said clause reads as follows:

Landlord and tenant hereby mutually waive any
and all rights which either may have to
request a jury trial in any proceeding at law
or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction).
3.

The "waiver of jury trial11 provision appears in the same

size print as the rest of the lease agreement and follows a bold
faced and underlined caption which reads "WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL" (R.
56 at Section 19.18 and R. 150).
4.

The table of contents of the Lease Agreement, which

begins on page 1 thereof, specifically sets forth all section
14

headings including the section entitled "WAIVER OP JURY TRIAL" (R.
9 and 150).
5.

Appellant has been in business for herself for 4 1/2

years (R. 145 at J 2).
6.

Appellant has the benefit of a college education (R. 145,

146) .
7.

The Lease Agreement which is the subject of the present

action is the second lease agreement with Appellee to which
Appellant was a party (R. 146)
8.

Appellant alleges that at the time she signed the Lease

Agreement in question she was not aware that it called for a waiver
of right to jury trial (R. 146).
FACTS RELEVANT TO DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
1.

On October 21, 1992 the Appellant filed an Objection to

Appellee's Affidavit of Fees which Affidavit was delivered to the
Court with the tentative Order Granting Appellee's Motion for
Summary Judgment on Appellant's Counterclaim (R. 528).
2.

Appellee filed a Memorandum in Response on October 27,

1992 (R. 549).
3.

On October 27, 1992 Judgment was entered against the

Appellant, dismissing her counterclaims and awarding Appellee its
attorney's fees (R. 607). Appellant never noticed up for decision
her objection to the Affidavit of Fees.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

It is uncontested that the Lease Agreement submitted to

the Court is the operative document controlling the rights of the
parties. Appellant admits that she is in breach of the Agreement.
Appellant further admits that there exists an obligation in the
amount of $6,665.98 owing to Appellee. The Lease Agreement further
contains a provision for attorney's fees.

Plaintiff incurred

attorney's fees in the amount of $1,560.00 pursuing its Complaint
to

Judgment,

which

allegation

is

uncontested

by

Appellant.

Consequently, and at a minimum, the Judgment entered by the
District Court must be affirmed in the amount of $8,225.98.
2.

The District Court properly ruled, as a matter of law,

that the Appellant's allegation that her store was not connected to
the duct system that provides heat, and therefore she did not
receive any heat or air conditioning in her store, does not
preclude entry of summary judgment.

The Lease Agreement which is

undeniably the controlling instrument, provides that the tenant is
responsible for the installation and proper operation of the
heating, ventilation and air conditioning "(HVAC)" delivery system
within the tenant's premises.

Therefore, the Judgment of the

District Court should be affirmed in its entirety.
3.

Appellee's Second Motion for Summary Judgment seeking

dismissal of Appellant's Counterclaim was supported by a Memorandum
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of Points and Authorities which included a Statement of Facts, all
of which were properly supported by references to the record. The
Appellant admitted all facts alleged therein, which facts sufficed
to

establish

Appellee's

prima
filed

facie
no

entitlement
evidentiary

to

summary

judgment.

The Appellant

materials

in

opposition.

Therefore the District Court properly concluded that

there was no question of fact and summary judgment was appropriate.
4.

Appellee's Motions for Summary Judgment were properly

granted, and therefore the propriety of the enforcement by the
District Court of Appellant's waiver of right to jury trial is
moot.
Further, a waiver of jury trial is enforceable if knowingly
made.

In the present case, the evidence is in dispute as to

whether the Appellant "knowingly" waived her right to jury trial.
When

the

evidence

of

a

"knowing"

waiver

is

disputed,

the

determination of whether the waiver was "knowing" is a question of
fact for the trier of fact.

The implicit finding of the lower

court, that this waiver was knowingly made, cannot be overturned
unless clearly erroneous.

There is ample factual basis in the

record to sustain the finding of the District Court.
Finally, contractual provisions waiving right to jury trial
are enforceable and not against public policy.
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5V

It is undisputed that the Lease Agreement, which is the

subject matter of this action, entitles Appellee to its attorneyfs
fees.

The only issue before this Court is the propriety of the

fees awarded.

Propriety of fees is a matter within the broad

discretion of the lower court and cannot be overturned absent a
clear abuse of discretion or a showing of patent error.

The fees

awarded were supported by an Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, which
Affidavit was unopposed by the Appellant. Therefore there is ample
factual basis in the record to sustain the finding of the District
Court.
INTRODUCTION
Appellee commenced the present action seeking recovery from
the Appellant for sums which were past due and owing pursuant to a
Lease Agreement. Upon answering the Appellant also made a request
for jury trial. Appellee filed a Motion to Strike the Request, as
the right to jury trial had been waived by contract.

This issue

was fully briefed by the parties and submitted to the Court for
decision.

The Court upheld the contractual waiver (R. 154). The

Appellant subsequently filed a Motion to Reconsider the same issue.
However that Motion was never noticed up for decision.

The

Appellant pursued the present appeal instead (R. 496). The ruling
of the District Court is proper.
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Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its Complaint
seeking recovery of $13,300.32 (R. 158 and 161). The matter was
fully briefed by the parties, the Appellant filing an Affidavit and
Memorandum in Response and the Appellee replying thereto.

In

response to Appellee1s Motion, Appellant admitted through her
Affidavit that there existed a debt due and owing in the amount of
$6,665.98 (R. 236).

Appellant denied liability for the sum of

$6,054.29 alleging she is entitled to an offset due to the nonexistence of HVAC services (R. 237). Finally, Appellant challenged
the propriety of miscellaneous minor charges totalling $580.05
which she felt were inappropriately charged to her account (R.
237) .

Thus, the Appellant addressed through her Affidavit, the

entire sum alleged as due and owing by the Appellee ($6,665.98 +
$6,054.29 + $580.05 = $13,300.32).

The Court determined that it

was the Appellant's duty to connect her store to the HVAC system,
and therefore Appellee was granted summary judgment for the amount
admittedly

due and owing

($6,665.98) and the claimed offset

($6,054.29) for a total judgment of $12,720.27 plus attorney's fees
(R. 273) . The judgment of the District Court is proper.
Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Appellant's
Counterclaim on September 4, 1992 (R. 358). Appellee's Motion and
Memorandum, properly supported by references to the record, showed
the Court that, pursuant to the terms of the Lease Agreement, the
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Appellant had no claim against Appellee for the damages she sought
to recover.

(R. 360).

The Appellant filed a Memorandum in

Response which contained no statement of facts and which made no
reference to affidavits, documentary evidence, discovery or other
evidentiary materials (R. 487). The District Court concluded that
the Appellant's Memorandum failed to raise a genuine issue as to a
material question of fact and granted Appellee's Motion for Summary
Judgment dismissing Appellant's Counterclaims

(R. 614).

The

judgment of the District Court is proper.
Upon conclusion of the Second Motion for Summary Judgment
Appellee submitted an Affidavit of additional attorney's fees
incurred since entry of the first judgment (R. 585). The Appellant
objected to the Affidavit of Fees as excessive (R. 528) .

The

District Court entered judgment in favor of the Appellee for the
full

amount

of

attorney's

fees

requested,

overruling

the

Appellant's Objection (R. 614). The ruling of the District Court
is proper.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER WHEN THERE IS NO
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT
The standard for entry of summary judgment as set forth in
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads as follows:

20

The judgment
sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is nQ germing jgsue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
(emphasis added)•
Utah case law makes it clear that Rule 56 requires two (2)
separate inquiries.

There must be a genuine issue of fact to be

resolved by the trier of fact. Further, the disputed fact must be
M

material to the outcome of the action.

The foregoing rule does

not preclude summary judgment simply whenever some fact remains in
dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted."
Healar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980).
In

the

present

action,

there

is

no

dispute

of

fact,

whatsoever, with regard to Appellee's right to at least a partial
summary judgment.

It is undisputed that the Lease Agreement

submitted to the Court is the operative document controlling the
rights and obligations of the parties.

Appellant concedes that

there exists an obligation due and owing to the Appellee pursuant
to that Agreement.

"I do not dispute that the amount due and owing

under the terms of my lease with TS 1 Partnership is $6,665.98."
(R 236).
It is similarly undenied that in the event of any default
Appellant is responsible for payment of reasonable attorney's fees,
legal expenses and all costs of collection in addition to the
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principal sum and interest due and owing under the Lease Agreement
(R. 160 at paragraph 6 and R. 233). Appellee incurred attorney's
fees in the amount of $1,560.00, the propriety of which amount was
not disputed by Appellant.

Consequently, there being no genuinee

issue of fact with regard to these portions of Appellee's claim,
summary judgment was properly entered in Appellee's favor in the
minimal amount of $8,225.98.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE APPELLANT'S
AFFIDAVIT FILED IN RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S NOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT DID
NOT RAISE AN ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
The Appellant alleges that the balance of Appellee's claim in
the amount of $6,054.29 is not due (R. 237 at paragraph 6 ) ; and
that these charges are improper as "I received no heat or air
conditioning in my store" (R. 237 at paragraph 7 ) .
However she does not allege that she connected her store to
the central HVAC system and that the central system was deficient.
She does not allege that there was no central system in the Mall.
These would raise material issues of fact as it was Appellee's duty
to install and maintain a central HVAC system (R. 250).
It is the Appellant's contention that her store was "never
connected to the duct system that provided HVAC services" (R. 237
at paragraph 7).

Therefore the system impliedly existed, but the

Appellant's store was never connected to the system, and she drew
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no heat or air conditioning therefrom.

Thus the factual question

raised by the Appellantfs Affidavit is whether her store was
connected to the central system, not the existence or adequacy of
that system.

It is undisputed that the Appellant remained in the

subject premises for the full two (2) years of her lease term and
held over in the premises thereafter (R. 160 at paragraph 5 and
233).

Thus, the Appellant allegedly attempted to conduct a retail

operation for a period in excess of two (2) years in the premises
without heat.

Further the Appellant desired to remain in those

premises beyond

the expiration

of her

Lease term.

However

improbable this may seem, the Appellee concedes that this may raise
a very improbable factual issue. It is not for the trial Court in
hearing the Motion for Summary Judgment to weigh evidence and
resolve improbable factual issues.

Singleton v. Alexander, 431

P.2d 126 (Utah 1967).
Appellee does not concede that Appellantfs premises were not
supplied with heat, ventilation and air conditioning.

On the

contrary, it is the Appellee's contention that Penny Allred did
connect her store to the HVAC system and did draw heat therefrom.
However, this issue is not material to the outcome of the Motion
for Summary Judgment.

It was the legal contractual duty of the

Appellant to design and install the HVAC distribution system within
her own store and connect that system to the Mallfs central system.
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The distribution system pursuant to which heated and cooled
air is delivered throughout the Appellant's leasehold premises is
the tenant's responsibility.
Tenant shall engineer, purchase and install
the HVAC distribution system, consisting of,
but not limited to, supply and return duct
work connection, supply and return devices,
fire dampers and controls. Tenant shall also
purchase and install VAV box or fan powered
VAV box with thermostat, or fan coil unit from
manufacturers specified by landlord.
It is
essential that tenant's engineer completely
familiarize himself with the landlord's system
and
the
regulations
of
landlord
and
jurisdictional authorities with respect to
exhaust, makeup air, maintenance of mall
positive pressure and design a system
accordingly. The design of such system, is
subject to landlord's approval prior to the
installation. Such approval does not warrant
performance of the tenant's distribution
system nor does it warrant the correctness of
tenant's engineering (R. 255).
(Emphasis
added.)
Thus, it was the Appellant's responsibility to purchase,
design and install the HVAC distribution system for her store. The
Appellant's obligation specifically
installation

of the supply and

includes the purchase and

return duct work connection.

Therefore if the Mall had a central heating, ventilation and air
conditioning system, which is undisputed, and the Appellant failed
to install "supply and return duct work connection" to the existing
central system, the responsibility is her own.
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Appellant relies on additional portions of the contract in
order to attempt to create the appearance of some duty on the part
of the landlord to perform these services.

The contractual

provisions on which the Appellant relies simply do not sustain her
position.

Appellant relies on the following contract provision:
Central System - landlord will provide and
maintain a central plant and a system of
chilled air to the premises installed at a
point determined by landlord. Tenant agrees
to adapt to landlord's central system and
provide a complete air distribution system
connected to the air volume control unit. The
air volume control unit and thermostat will be
furnished and installed by the landlord, at
the tenant's expense and sized to accommodate
the design conditions as defined below in
paragraph (1) or upgrade design conditions if
the same are required by tenant's approved
plans and specifications (R. 250).

Again, the only obligation placed on the landlord by this
passage is the provision and maintenance of a central HVAC system.
It is undisputed that such a system was provided.

Rather than

supporting the Appellant's position, the passage

relied upon

supports the Appellee's

contention that

it was the tenant's

obligation to adapt her distribution system to the central system.
Specifically, the second sentence of the quoted paragraph states
that "tenant agrees to adapt to landlord's central system and
provide a complete air distribution system. . ."
Therefore, in addition to the past due lease payments that the
Appellant does not dispute

($6,665.98), Appellee was properly

granted summary judgment for the additional amount of $6,054.29
which Appellant claimed as an offset for the allegedly defective
HVAC system#

for a total summary judgment of $12,720.27 plus

attorneyfs fees.

POINT HT
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT, SINCE THE
APPELLANT SUBMITTED NO AFFIDAVITS OR EVIDENTIARY MATERIALS IN
OPPOSITION TO APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HER
COUNTERCLAIM, APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM DID NOT RAISE AN ISSUE OF
MATERIAL FACT TO PRECLUDE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE UPHELD IF IT CAN BE
UPHELD ON ANY PROPER THEORY
It is well established law in the State of Utah that this

Court should affirm the decision of the District Court if it can do
so on any proper ground. Matter of Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605
(Utah 1982) . The Utah Supreme Court has gone so far as to say this
rule should be enforced even in cases where the lower court
assigned a specific but incorrect reason for its ruling.
In any event, we are inclined to affirm a
trial court's decision whenever we can do so
on proper grounds even though the trial court
may have assigned an incorrect reason for its
ruling.
Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980).
In the present case the trial court could have granted
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment on Appellant's Counterclaim
on either of two theories.

The lower court could have been

persuaded that, due to the fact that the Appellant filed no
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evidentiary materials in support of its Memorandum, the Memorandum
was insufficient to raise a genuine issue as to material fact.
In the

alternative, the

Court

could

have

examined

the

Appellant's claims in light of the four corners of the Lease
Agreement and ruled that any extraneous representations were
inadmissable.

This Court should uphold the lower court's ruling

based upon either rationale.

Appellee will address each of the

propositions in turn.
B.

THE APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM FILED IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO RAISE A
QUESTION OF FACT.
The Appellant's Counterclaim seeks recovery of damages in

three categories.

The Appellant asks for recovery of sums she

expended for tenant improvements to her store.

She seeks damages

based on the allegation that she had some implied, exclusive
franchise to sell clocks, watches and other gift items and that the
Appellee violated her exclusive right by leasing space to a
different gift store.

Finally, she seeks damages for business

interruption resulting from the remodeling of the Trolley Square
Mall.
Appellee filed a Memorandum including a five-page Statement of
Facts all of which were properly supported by references to the
record. The facts alleged by the Appellee conclusively established
that the Appellant is barred from recovering the damages she
27

requests by the express language of the Lease Agreement.

Appellee

showed the court sixteen (16) contract provisions which make tenant
improvements the tenant's responsibility (R. 362-363). In response
to the Appellant's claim that she is entitled to damages for
business interruption resulting from remodeling the Appellee showed
the lower court that it had not only the right but the affirmative
duty to remodel and maintain the Mall.

Though the Mall was never

actually closed, Appellee showed the lower court that it had the
right to go so far as to completely close the Mall in furtherance
of

remodeling

(R.

363-364).

Further,

the

Lease

Agreement

specifically protects the Appellee from liability resulting from
business interruption or interference resulting from remodeling (R.
386) .
Finally, and addressing the Appellant's claim that she had
some exclusive right to sell gift items, the Appellee showed the
Court that the contract contained no clause granting such a right,
that it is a fully integrated instrument and that by its express
terms it constituted the " . . . complete and exclusive statement of
the terms . . . "

of their agreement (R. 426).

In her Memorandum in Response the Appellant affirmatively
admitted that all of the Appellee's allegations were true.
Therefore, the Appellee, conclusively established that it is
entitled to summary judgment on the contract, as a matter of law,
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unless the Appellant's Memorandum included some evidence of a type
which would somehow void or nullify the contract.

The District

Court properly determined that the Appellant failed to produce any
such evidence.
The Appellant's Memorandum in Response contained no statement
of facts (R. 487), and was not supported by affidavit, depositions
or any evidentiary material of any kind.

Therefore, it cannot

legally raise a question of fact. Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. governing motions for summary judgment reads in relevant
part as follows:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant tries to rest strictly on the allegations of her
Counterclaim which is clearly insufficient under Rule 56.
Under preexisting Utah law the Appellant's tactics would have
been considered sufficient. Prior to the 1965 amendment of Rule 56
Utah was the one state in the union where a party was allowed to
rest on its pleadings and receive the benefit of a presumption that
all the allegations thereof where true.
stated that:
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Prior to 1965 Rule 56

f,

The adverse party prior to the date of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits/1
(emphasis added) but is not required to do so.
He may stand upon his pleadings provided his
allegations, if proved, would establish a
basis for recovery.
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as quoted in Christensen v.
Financial Service Co.. 377 P.2d 1010 (Utah 1963).
However, the 1965 amendment added the language cited earlier
that one may not rest on his pleadings and the decisions of the
Utah Supreme Court following the 1965 amendment further support
this interpretation of new Rule 56.
Thus, when a party opposes a properly
supported motion for summary judgment and
fails to file any responsive affidavit or
other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule
56(e), the trial court may properly conclude
that there are no genuine issues of fact
unless the face of the movant's affidavit
affirmatively discloses the existence of such
an issue. Without such a showing the court
need only decide whether, on the basis of the
applicable law, the moving party is entitled
to judgment.
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company. 659 P.2d
1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).

See also. United American Life Insurance

Company v. Willey, 444 P.2d 755 (Utah 1968).
Finally, even if the Appellant were permitted to rest on the
alleaations of her Counterclaim those allegations are legally
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insufficient.

Under Utah law there are nine elements to be shown

in support of an allegation of fraud.1
If this Court were to examine the language of the Appellants
Counterclaim (R. 70-71), it would see that the Appellant has made
no allegation that Appellee had any knowledge of the falsity of the
alleged statements nor is there any allegation of recklessness.
She has not alleged that she relied reasonably and most importantly
cannot allege that she relied to her detriment since her supposed
damage (tenant improvements) was contractually her responsibility.
Finally, the misrepresentations which the Appellant sets forth in
her Counterclaim pertain to Appellee's plans for the future of the
Mall and not to presently existing facts. The Appellant supplied
no evidentiary material with her Memorandum in Response to the
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Therefore, there was no evidence of

fraud before the lower court and the court properly entered summary
judgment.
1

The elements of a fraudulent representation are:

(1) that a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
representor either (a) new to be false, or (b) made recklessly,
knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to
act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
Pace v. Parrish. 247 P.2d 273, 274 (Utah 1952), as quoted in Wright
v, Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1990).
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Alternatively, the District Court may have granted summary
judgment

based

upon

a

determination

that

the

Defendant's

allegations are inadmissable parol evidence. It is undisputed that
the Lease Agreement is a fully integrated instrument to which the
parol evidence rule would apply.
An agreement is integrated where the parties
thereto adopt a writing or writings as the
final
and
complete
expression
of
the
agreement. An integration is the writing or
writings so adopted . . . an essential element
of an integration is that the parties shall
have manifested their assent not only to the
provisions of their agreement but the writing
or writings in question as the final statement
of their intentions as to the matters
contained therein.
EIE v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981).
(See also. Bullfrog Marina Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972).
The Lease Agreement contains an integration clause in which
the parties

expressly

assent

to the agreement

as the final

statement of their intentions.
This writing is intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement and as a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms
thereof, all negotiations, considerations and
representations between the parties having
been incorporated herein.
. . .
No
representations, understandings or agreements
have been made or relied upon in the making of
this Lease other than those specifically set
forth herein.
. . . This Lease can be
modified only by a writing signed by each of
the parties hereto (R. 426).
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The Lease Agreement is the complete statement of the party's
contractual arrangement. Further, the integration clause includes
an affirmative representation by the parties thereto that they are
not relying on any prior representations. Thus, the Court can find
the intentions of the parties with regard to the integration within
the four corners of the instrument itself.

Stanaer v. Sentinel

Sec. Life Ins. Co.. 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983).
Courts have also considered the completeness of an instrument
when considering whether it constitutes an integration.
v. Ryttincr. 451 P.2d 769 (Utah 1969).

Rainford

The Lease Agreement is

obviously a "complete11 instrument. The principal terms of the base
Lease Agreement span 50 pages (R. 377 through R. 429). Schedules
and exhibits attached thereto which set forth the respective rights
and obligation of the party in greater detail expand the lease to
a total of 78 pages (R. 377 through R. 455).
Further, parol evidence is not even admissible to prove fraud
when the fraud of which a party complains is already covered by the
contract in question.

On the contrary, it must "an additional act

not covered by the terms of the contract, as the parol evidence is
not admissible in the case of a promise directly at variance with
the terms of a written instrument". Spudnuts v. Lane. 641 P.2d 915
(Ariz. App. 1982).

See also. F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Hansen

Dairy. Inc.. 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980).
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Summary judgment may have been granted based upon the District
Court1s conclusion that, since there was no evidence of fraud
before it, there was no question of fact.

Summary judgment may

have been granted based upon the conclusion of the court that the
Defendant's allegations were inadmissable parol evidence.

The

District Court must be affirmed if summary judgment was proper on
either basis.

It was proper on both.
POINT IV

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ENFORCED APPELLANT'S
CONTRACTUAL WAIVER OF RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
K.

THE PROPRIETY OF THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS MOOT
As set forth above, Summary Judgment was properly entered in

favor of Appellee. Therefore, there is nothing to resolve at trial
and no need for a jury.

The relief requested by the Appellant

cannot effect her rights.
If the requested judicial relief cannot effect
the rights of the litigants, the case is moot
and a court will normally refrain from
adjudicating it on the merits.
Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224, 229 (Utah 1983).
Thus, even if the District Court erred in enforcing the
waiver, that error is harmless and does not constitute a ground on
which Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment can be set aside.
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B.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ENFORCED APPELLANT'S WAIVER
It is undisputed that the lease agreement submitted to the

Court is the operative document controlling the rights of the
parties.

Pursuant to Section 19.18 of the Lease Agreement,

Appellant waived her right to jury trial.
Landlord and tenant hereby mutually waive any
and all rights which either may have to
request a jury trial in any proceeding at law
or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction (R.56 and 80).
There is ample authority, constitutional, statutory and at
common law, that such waivers are enforceable.

The relevant

statute is Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-1 (1953 as amended) which reads
as follows:
In actions for the recovery of specific real
and personal property, with or without
damages, or for money claimed as due upon
contract or as damages for breach of contract,
or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried
by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a
reference is ordered. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, a civil matter "may be tried by a jury" but does not
necessarily have to be tried to a jury.
subject to waiver.

Further, that right is

By executing the lease agreement, Appellant

waived her right to jury trial.
Contractual waivers of right to jury trial are neither illegal
nor contrary to public policy.

Smith-Johnson Motor Corp. v.

Hoffman Motors Corp. 411 F.Supp. 670, 677 (E.D. Virginia 1975).
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Therefore, they are enforceable absent a showing of good cause to
the contrary.

Id.

This position, is in accordance with the

majority of the jurisdictions which have examined this issue.
The validity of contractual provisions waiving
jury trial, made independently of any pending
litigation, has been recognized or assumed in
a very large majority of the cases which have
considered such provisions.
47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 85.
Thus, the issue before the District Court was whether the
waiver was "knowing and voluntary".
Those cases in which the validity of a
contractual waiver of jury trial has been an
issue have overwhelmingly applied the knowing
and voluntary standard.
K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir.
1985).
Further,

the

Appellant

carries

the

burden

of

proof

of

demonstrating that her consent was not knowing and voluntary.
We agree that in the context of an express
contractual waiver the objecting party should
have the burden of demonstrating that its
consent to the provision was not knowing and
voluntary.
Id. at 758.
Finally, whether the Appellant made a knowing waiver, is a
question of fact.
Ordinarily, the question of waiver is one of
fact for a jury. That is to say, where the
evidence concerning waiver, or an element or
requisite thereof, is conflicting or disputed,
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or where more than one reasonable inference
may be drawn from the evidence, the question
of waiver is one of fact for the trier of
facts.
28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 174.
The
therefore

District
impliedly

Court

enforced

the

Appellantfs

waiver

and

found that Ms. Allred made a knowing and

voluntary waiver of her right.

That finding is one of fact which

is presumptively correct and cannot be overturned unless it is
clearly erroneous and without any reasonable basis in the evidence.
College Irr. v. Logan R. and The Blacksmith F. , 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah
1989), Homeowners Loan Corporation v. Bank of Arizona, 94 P.2d 457
(Ariz. 1939).
In the present case there was ample evidence before

the

District Court on which to base a finding of a knowing waiver.
That evidence includes the following:
(a)

The Lease Agreement contains a clause waiving the

right to jury trial (R. 56 and Addendum at Exhibit "A" Page
48, Section 19.18);
(b)

The waiver of jury trial provision appears in the

same size print as the rest of the Lease Agreement (R. 56, 150
and Addendum at Exhibit "A" Page 48, Section 19.18);
(c)

The waiver of jury trial provision carries a bold

face and underline caption which reads "WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL"
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(R. 56, 150 and Addendum at Exhibit

M

AH

Page 48, Section

19.18) ;
(d)

The table of contents of the Lease Agreement, which

begins on Page 1 thereof, specifically sets forth all section
headings including the section entitled "WAIVER OP JURY TRIAL11
(R. 9, 150 and Addendum at Exhibit "A H Page 2 ) ;
(e)

Appellant has been in business for herself for four

and one half (4 1/2) years (R. 145 at f 2 ) ;
(f)

Appellant has the benefit of a college education (R.

145, 145); and
(g)

The Lease Agreement which is the subject matter of

the present action is the second lease agreement with Appellee
to which Appellant was a party (R. 146).
In support of her contention that she was not aware of the
waiver clause (R. 146), Appellant alleges that the clause was not
brought to her attention by Appellee

(R. 146) ; that the clause

appears on page 48 of a 51 page agreement; and that she was not
aware that the lease called for a waiver of right to jury trial (R.
146) .
In light of the evidence which was before the District Court
it cannot be said that there was no reasonable basis for that
court 1 s ruling, or that the court f s ruling was clearly erroneous.
At no time does the Appellant allege that she failed to read the
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contract prior to signing it. Howeverf even if she were to allege
that she did not read the contract, that would not justify the
relief she requests.
Each party has the burden to understand the
terms of the contract before he affixes his
signature to it and may not thereafter assert
his ignorance in defense. • . Ignorance of
the contents of an instrument does not
ordinarily affect the liability of one who
signs it. . . If a man acts negligently and
in such a way as to justify others in
supposing that the written instrument is
consented to by him, he will be bound both at
law and in equity . . . If the contract is
plain and unequivocal in its terms, he is
ordinarily bound thereby.
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch. 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 (Utah
1985).
The same rule would apply to the Appellant's allegation that
the clause was not brought to her attention.

It is her duty to

read and understand the contract before signing it.
The Appellant argues at length that the right to a jury trial
in the state of Utah is protected by the Utah State Constitution.
The relevant portion of the Utah State Constitution reads as
follows:
In capital cases the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury
shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of
four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict
shall be unanimous.
In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A
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iurv in civil cases shall be waived unless
demanded. (Emphasis added.)
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 10.
The State Constitution clearly permits waiver.

The critical

language is the last sentence which states that in civil cases the
right to trial by jury "shall be waived" unless demanded.

It

should also be noted that the right to a jury trial can be waived
through mere silence.

The waiver before the District Court and

before this Court is not one inferred
expressly and affirmatively made.

from silence but one

It cannot be said that the

District Court was clearly erroneous or that it did not have an
adequate basis in the evidence when it enforced the waiver.
POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY OVERRULED THE APPELLANT'S
OBJECTION TO APPELLEE18 AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
In conjunction with Appellee1s Second Motion for Summary
Judgment (seeking dismissal of Appellantfs Counterclaim) Appellee
requested an award of attorney's fees as provided by contract.
Appellee's request for attorney's fees and costs was supported by
the Affidavit of Arnold Richer which included a summary of all fees
and costs incurred (R. 580). Appellee requested fees and costs in
the amount of $8,760.00 which represented all fees and costs
incurred since the granting of Appellee's First Motion for Summary
Judgment, twenty-three (23) months earlier.
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On October 22, 1992 the Appellant filed an Objection to the
request for attorney's fees.

However, the Objection was not

supported by any affidavit or other evidentiary materials.

The

District Court entered an Order and Judgment on October 27, 1992
granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and awarding fees
as requested.

Impliedly the Defendant's Objection, unsupported by

any evidence, was overruled. The District Court properly overruled
the Objection and awarded the fees.
Appellee is entitled to fees pursuant to the terms of the
contract admittedly executed by the parties.

Therefore, the only

issue before the lower court and the only issue under review at
this time is the reasonableness of the amount requested and
awarded.
It is well established law in Utah that the reasonableness of
attorney's fees is a matter within the discretion of the court and
will only be disturbed on review for the strongest reasons.
In the absence of a showing of patent error or
clear abuse of discretion, we do not disturb
the judgment of the trial court.
Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982).
In the present case the Appellee's request for attorney's fees
was supported by an Affidavit which itemized and defended every fee
requested.

In response to that Affidavit the Appellant filed no

evidentiary materials whatsoever, merely an unsupported objection.
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The ruling of the lower court clearly cannot be called patent error
when based upon an unrebutted affidavit. Freed Finance Company v.
Stoker Motor Company, 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975).
Though

the

ruling

of

the

District

Court

is

clearly

unassailable, Appellee will address the specific fees to which the
Appellant objects.

Appellant objects to all fees incurred by

Appellee in connection with the Appellant's first abortive attempt
to appeal the order granting Appelleefs First Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Appellant contends that Appellee is not entitled to
fees for time "spent pursuing the fruitless certification and
appeal

of

Plaintifffs

claim

against

Defendant."

(R. 528).

Appellant would have this Court believe that Appellee pursued a
fruitless appeal. On the contrary, the Appellee was the prevailing
party and it was the Appellant's appeal which was pursued and
ultimately dismissed.
It should also be noted that the Appellant consented to
certification of the Judgment as final (R. 312).

Further, the

Appellant did not resist the Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification.
The Appellant filed a Motion to Stay Execution on the theory that
the Judgment was not final.

Appellee responded with a Motion to

Certify under Rule 54(b).

The Appellant then filed a Reply

Memorandum which did not resist certification but which on the
contrary stated that "Rule 54(b) is no answer to Defendant's Motion
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to Stay Execution.

Execution should be stayed even if the Order

and Judgment is final and appealable.11

(R. 299-300).

Even when

this Court put the parties on notice of its concerns about the
finality of the Judgment by sending its Notice of Sua Sponte
Consideration for Dismissal the Appellant continued to defend the
finality of the Judgment saying:
The trial court's November 2 money judgment is
perfectly suited for Rule 54(b) certification.
It completely disposed of plaintiff's only
claim against defendant, and for the reasons
stated
by
plaintiff,
the
trial
court
determined that there was no just reason for
waiting for the disposition of defendant's
counterclaim before entering that judgment as
final (R. 552).
Ultimately the Rule 54(b) certification was overturned based
upon this Court's reliance on the case of Kennecott Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n.. 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991), which decision had
not been rendered at the time of the original certification. This
case unfortunately deprived this Court of jurisdiction to hear the
Appellant's

first appeal and compelled

remand.

However, the

Appellant voluntarily choose to file her appeal with the full
knowledge that in the event it was unsuccessful she would be liable
for attorney's fees.

She could have resisted certification but

preferred immediate certification and appeal.

She cannot know be

heard to complain of fees which were necessarily
response to her abortive appeal.
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incurred in

The Appellant also objects to fees incurred by Appellee in
attempts to collect the bond she posted as security for her first
appeal as well as fees incurred

in attempting

to arrange a

settlement conference, the only subject matter of which was the
Appellantfs Counterclaims.

Again, the propriety of these fees is

a matter well within the discretion of the lower court.

Fees

incurred in attempting to obtain the supersedeas bond posted by the
Appellant were properly incurred. Upon dismissal of her appeal the
supersedeas bond was available to satisfy the Judgment until such
time as Appellee was once again stayed.

Further, many of those

fees were incurred in negotiations with Appellant's counsel who
requested substitution of the municipal bonds which constituted the
supersedeas bond. At the Appellant's request Appellee prepared the
necessary paperwork and forwarded it to Appellant's counsel.

A

copy of the joint Stipulation and Order prepared by Appellee at
Appellant's request appears in the Court record (R. 568).

The

Appellant then failed to ever sign the Stipulation she herself had
requested.

Most of the fees incurred were incurred by Appellee in

preparing those documents and attempting to obtain their execution
by the Appellant.

Appellant cannot be heard to complain of fees

incurred in negotiations initiated at her request the object of
which was to allow amendment of her bond for her convenience.
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Finally, the Appellant cannot be heard to object to fees
incurred by the Appellee attempting to arrange a settlement
conference.

These fees were incurred at a time when the only

matter remaining before the District Court was the Appellantfs
Counterclaim.

The

Appellant

took

Counterclaim to a conclusion.

no

action

to

move

her

All of the steps taken by the

Appellee were the responsibility of the Appellant if she had
desired in good faith to move her Counterclaim to a conclusion.
She did not and therefore Appellee was compelled to do her job for
her.
The award of fees can only be overturned
discretion and patent error.
unrebutted affidavit.
error.

Further,

for abuse of

The District Court relied on an

Consequently, it cannot be called patent

even

if

this

Court

were

to

review

the

reasonableness or propriety of the particular fees to which the
Appellant

objects,

those

fees

were

properly

and

reasonably

incurred.
CONCLUSION
It

is undisputed

that

the

Lease Agreement

and

related

schedules which have been submitted to the court are the operative
documents which control the rights and mutual obligations of the
parties to this action. Pursuant to those documents, the Appellee
was

entitled

to

receive

a

rental
45

stream

from

the premises

admittedly occupied by Appellant. The Appellee is further entitled
to recovery of attorney's fees in the event of any default.
Appellant admits her default and the existence of an arrearage
in the amount of $6,665.98. The Appellant alleges she is entitled
to as an offset ($6,054.29) for defective HVAC performance.

The

Appellant is entitled to no such offset.
Appellant was under a contractual duty to install and maintain
an HVAC delivery system within her premises, and it was her
obligation to connect that system to the central heating system of
the Trolley

Square Mall.

Consequently

summary

judgment was

properly entered for Appellee in the amount of $12,720.27 plus
attorney's fees.
Appellee

also

obtained

Appellant's Counterclaim.

summary

judgment

dismissing

the

That ruling should be upheld.

In

response to the Appellee's properly supported Motion for Summary
Judgment the Appellant filed no evidentiary materials.

Therefore

the District Court could have properly ruled that no question of
fact

was

raised

and

summary

judgment

was

proper.

In

the

alternative, the District Court may have ruled that in light of the
fact that the Lease Agreement contained a provision that no prior
representations had been made or relied upon, the allegations of
the Appellant's

Counterclaim

to the contrary were

in direct

conflict with the express terms of the agreement and parol evidence
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is inadmissable to contradict the express terms of an agreement.
If the decision of the District Court can be upheld on either
basis, it should be upheld.
The third issue raised by the Appellant, concerning the
contractual waiver of right to jury trial, is a moot issue as
summary judgment was properly entered.

However, even if summary

judgment was not properly entered, the waiver would nevertheless be
enforceable.
Contractual

provisions waiving

right

to

enforceable and not contrary to public policy.

jury

trial

are

In the state of

Utah the right to jury trial is subject to waiver both pursuant to
the Utah Constitution and pursuant to Statute.
Waivers are enforceable if knowingly and voluntarily made.
There is ample evidence before the lower court on which to find
that the Appellant made a knowing waiver of her right to jury
trial. The lower court properly enforced the waiver provision and
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee and
those rulings should be affirmed.
Finally, the Appellee received an award of attorneyfs fees in
connection with its First Motion for Summary Judgment. An award of
after-accruing

attorney's

fees

was

made

in

Appelleefs Second Motion for Summary Judgment.

connection

with

The Defendant

objected to the Affidavit of Fees supporting that award but filed
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no counter affidavit.

The District Court awarded the fees. Such

an award can only be overturned
discretion and patent error.

if it is a clear abuse of

It cannot be said that it was patent

error to award Plaintiff its after-accruing fees in light of the
fact that the Affidavit was unopposed.
The Appellee is entitled to its attorney's fees and costs
pursuant to the Lease Agreement between the parties.
this matter should be remanded

to the District

Therefore,

Court

for a

determination and an award of additional costs and additional
attorney's fees incurred in responding to this appeal.
G.G.A.. Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989).

(See

Finally,

the Appellant has posted a supersedeas bond pursuant to which
Appellee is stayed from execution pending outcome of this appeal.
That stay should be lifted, and the bond should be released to
Appellee forthwith.
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DATED this

p}Q day of March, 1993.
RICHER, SWAM £ OVERHOLT, P.C.

By

UAM^/tJ^^lU^y^

Arnold Richer

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed in the United States Mail,
first class, postage prepaid this J2I2. day of March, 1993 to the
following:
Donald L. Dalton, Esquire
Robert W. Payne, Esquire
VAN COTT, BA6LEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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EXHIBIT "A1

FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Item Court ot Appeals
TSl Partnership, an Indiana
Limited Partnership,

NOTICE OF SUA SPONTE
CONSIDERATION BY THE
COURT FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Penny Allred d/b/a/ It's About
Time,

Case No. 910189-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:
This case is being considered for summary dismissal on the
basis that the 54(b) certification does not provide that "there
is no just reason for delay," Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692
P.2d 765 (Utah 1984) and that the case may be ineligible for
54(b) certification under Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991).

In lieu of a brief, both

parties are requested to file a memorandum, not to exceed ten
pages, explaining why summary disposition should, or should not,
be granted by the court.

An original and four copies of the

memorandum should be filed with the Clerk of the Utah Court of
Appeals on or before December 31, 1991.
DATED this /#

day of December, 1991.

Mary T/. ^Noonan
Clerk/ Utah Court of Appeals

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of December, 1991, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF SUA SPONTE
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION was deposited
in the United States mail to the parties listed below:
Donald L. Dalton
Robert W. Payne
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Attorneys at Law
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT
84145
Arnold Richer
Mark E. Medcalf
Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
311 South State, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dated this 18th day of December, 1991.

By

^

'Y£/U-C<C-/

//•£•/

Deputy Cler]^/

EXHIBIT "B

FILED
JAN 9 1992
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
TS 1 Partnership, an Indiana
Limited Partnership,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ydaM
Mary T Hzcr^
Cterkof toe C:^r*
Utah Court ot App^a
ORDER

Case No. 910189-CA

v.
Penny Allred d/b/a It's About
Time,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the court on its own motion for
summary disposition on the basis that the case should be
dismissed under Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814
P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991) and its progeny.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied and ruling on
the issues raised in the briefs and in the court's sua sponte
notice are deferred pending plenary presentation and
consideration of the case.
Dated this

<Q'—day of January, 1992,

Russell W. Bench, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of January, 1992, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the parties listed below:
Donald L. Dalton
Robert W. Payne
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Attorneys at Law
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT
84145
Arnold Richer
Mark E. Medcalf
Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
311 South State, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dated this 9th day of January, 1992.

Deputy/Clerk

